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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
The Iranian Assets Control Regulations and the 
International Monetary Fund: Are the Regulations 
"Exchange Control Regulations?" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After the President's Executive Order blocking Iranian assets subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States/ the Treasury Department issued the Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations (Regulations)2 which prohibited transactions, not 
licensed by the Treasury Department, in which Iran had any interest. If the 
Regulations are "exchange control regulations" within the meaning of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement (Agreement),3 their conse-
quences would reach far beyond the administrative jurisdiction of the United 
States. This question, which as yet has not been answered, has been of recent 
interest and has continuing significance. 4 Off-shore branches of United States 
banks, bound by these, or similar, regulations, could invoke principles of in-
1. Exec. Order No. 12, 170, H Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979). 
After months of increasing tension between the United States and Iran following the fall of the 
Shah, Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979 and took its 
staff hostage. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 6. Ignoring the normal responsibilities of host 
governments in such cases, the Iranian government refused to protect the safety of U. S. citizens 
and property. 
On November 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Bani Sadr threatened to withdraw Iranian assets 
(approximately $6-12 billion) from American banks. Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
[F.B.I.S.) Nov. 11, 1979, RI. On the same day, President Carter, acting pursuant to the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act 50 U.s.C. H 1701-1734 (1980), The National Emergen-
cies Act 50 U.S.C. H 1601-1650 (1980), and 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1980), issued Executive Order No. 
12,170, blocking all assets of the Iranian government subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
2. 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1979), H Fed. Reg. 65, 956 (1979). On November 28, 1979, the U.S. 
Treasury notified International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the Regulations. Notification took the 
form of a letter from the Treasury Department of the United States to the Director of the IMF 
Executive Board. See Gordon, TRENDS: THE BLOCKING OF IRANIAN ASSETS 14 INT'L LAW. 659, 
674 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gordon). 
3. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. No. 
2322,2 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter cited as Agreement). 
4. This question has been the source of litigation in the past, see, e.g., J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. 
Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd. 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975) aff'd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, urt. den., 423 
U.S. 866, and will continue to be the source of litigation in the future, so long as governments use 
exchange control regulations. 
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ternationallaw before foreign tribunals to avoid contractual, dollar obligations 
which would normally be binding under the domestic law of the bank's host 
country. Thus, in the age of the Eurodollar, U.S. exchange controls could af-
fect transactions and financial obligations within one-hundred-thirty-eight 
IMF member nations.s As long as economic, rather than military, conflict is 
used to conduct international disputes, this question merits attention. 
This Comment will examine certain of the questions which were raised 
recently in foreign litigation6 involving the Iranian Assets Control Regulations 
of the United States. 7 Specifically, the use in British courts of the argument 
that Article VIII § 2(b) of the Agreement frees the London branches from 
their customary obligation to repay funds deposited by Iran and Iranian en-
tities will be discussed. This argument - that the Regulations operate 
through the Fund Agreement to make such contractual obligations unen-
forceable in IMF member nations - is known as the "Bretton Woods 
Defense," a reference to the site where the IMF Agreement was concluded. 
The validity of the "Bretton Woods Defense" depends upon the application of 
Article VIII S 2(b) of the Agreement to the Regulations. The United 
Kingdom is a member of the IMFB and British law accepts the obligation im-
posed by Article VIII § 2(b) to give effect to certain foreign "exchange control 
regulations" within the United Kingdom. 9 If all of the requirements of Article 
VIII § 2(b) are met by the Regulations, tribunals ofthe United Kingdom and 
other IMF member nations would be required to hold unenforceable the con-
tractual obligations of the U.S. banks to repay Iranian deposits. to Thus, even 
5. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND 
EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 466-70 (Washington, D.C. 1979). [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL 
REPORT ON EXCHANGE). The latest IMF report on exchange arrangements indicates that there 
are 138 IMF member nations. /d. 
6. See, e.g., Bank Markazi Iran v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, [1979) Queen's Bench 
[Q.B.) No. 5907; Bank Markazi Iran v. The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., [1979) Q.B. No. 
5973. As a result of the freeze order, American banks refused to draw on Iranian assets to pay 
Iran's interest obligation on its Eurodollar Loan. Iran could make payments from these assets 
only if it made further deposits. 31 C.F.R. S 535.201 (1980) as ammded by 31 C.F.R. S 535.508 
(1980). Iran refused to do. The banks therefore declared the obligation in default and offset Iran's 
frozen accounts for the full amount of the loan. Iran sued challenging the offset and the ap-
plicability of the President's freeze order to Iran's deposits in Foreign branches of American 
banks. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 661. 
7. Article VIII S 2(b) of the Agreement would also require an inquiry into whether or not the 
deposit arrangements were "exchange contracts." Much has been written on the subject of the 
meaning of "exchange contracts," although the question has not been entirely resolved. See, e.g., 
F. MANN. THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 421 (3rd ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MANN); 
Nussbaum, Ex..'uJnge Controls and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L. J. 421, 426-27 (1949). 
The issue, however, is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
8. Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 1945, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 19. 
9. /d. See ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE, supra note 5, at 470. 
10. See Decision No. 446-4, Jun. 10, 1949, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 131-32 (8th issue, 1976) [hereinafter cited 
as SELECTED DECISIONS). 
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if the seizures of Iranian deposits were improper under the commercial law of 
England, an English branch of a U.S. bank could not be forced to repay the 
seized deposits.l1 If the requirements of Article VIII § 2(b) are not met, 
however, the "Bretton Woods Defense" would fail and the parties would be 
left to determine their rights under the general principles of commercial law 
and conflict of laws. 12 
This Comment will offer a brief history of exchange controls prior to the 
establishment of the Fund. A definition of' 'exchange control regulation," as 
the term is used in the Fund Agreement, will be suggested and analyzed. In 
the context of that suggested definition, the author will examine the Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations. Then, the question of whether the Iranian Assets 
Control Regulations were imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement will 
be discussed in light of the Fund's policies with respect to financial restric-
tions. Finally, the author concludes that the Regulations cannot properly be 
considered "exchange control regulations" and that, in any case, the Regula-
tions were not imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. Thus, the so-
called "Bretton Woods Defense" is inapplicable to the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations and the use of this argument should be unsuccessful in this and 
similar cases. 
II. THE MEANING OF "EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS" 
There is no generally accepted definition of the term "exchange control 
regulations." In the Agreement, while several provisions refer to "exchange 
controls," 13 the term is left undefined. The Executive Directors of the IMF 
have never issued a formal interpretation of the term's meaning. In order to 
determine the meaning of "exchange control regulations" as it is used in the 
Agreement, one must examine: the objectives of the IMF, the context in 
which the term was used within the agreements and the generally understood 
meaning of the term at the time the Agreement was drafted. 
A. The Use of Exchange Controls Prior to the Establishment of the International 
Monetary Fund 
Although the use of exchange controls can be traced back to 1353, this 
device was not widely used until the 1930's.14 In fourteenth century England, 
the concept of economic controls first appeared in international trade when the 
Statute of Staple forbid' 'merchant strangers" to take any more money out of 
11. Set id. Set also notes 144-46 and accompanying text, infra. 
12. Set, e.g., Williams, Fortign Exchange Control Regulation and the New York Court oj Appeals: J. 
Zetvi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 9 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 239, 248 (1976). 
13. See, e.g., Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII, H 2(b), 5(a)(xi). 
14. See, e.g., A. NUSSBAUM. MONEY IN THE LAW. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 447 (rev. ed. 
1950) [hereinafter cited as NUSSBAUM]; M. SHUSTER, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
MONEY 96 n.2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SHUSTER]. 
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the country than they had brought in to it.15 After the mercantile era, and un-
til the period of World War I, exchange controls were rarely used. 16 The war 
and its immediate aftermath, at first produced only a slight increase in the use 
of exchange controlsY The period ending in the 1930's can be characterized 
as a time of relative freedom in international finance. 
However, the monetary crisis which accompanied the worldwide depression 
of the 1930's stimulated the use of exchange controls by economically dis-
tressed governments. Specifically, the abrupt end of the era of free interna-
tional payments is often traced to the failure of the Austrian Credit Anstalt in 
1931.18 The economic chaos which followed was characterized by wild curren-
cy fluctuations and speculative capital movements. 19 Together with the Sec-
ond World War, these adversities produced a system of restricted interna-
tional payments. 20 The economic nationalism and monetary warfare of the era 
was characterized by the widespread use of direct economic controls,21 in-
cluding trade barriers and exchange control regulations. 22 Initially, exchange 
controls were introduced unilaterally to protect currency supplies23 and to 
maintain equilibrium in balances of payments. 24 Trading partners of nations 
which had imposed controls, often imposed their own controls in retaliation. 25 
Ultimately, to keep international trade open, states began to agree to bilateral 
arrangements which regulated their economic and commercial relations. 26 
Several forms of exchange controls developed during this period. 27 These 
included: 1) regulations mandating the observance of certain procedures, such 
as obtaining licenses, before international payments could be made;28 2) 
15. NUSSBAUM, supra note H, at 447. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. SHUSTER. supra note H, at 97; Freutel, Excho.nge Control, Freezing Orders, and the Conflict of 
Laws, 56 HARV. L. REV. 30,30 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Freutel]. For a thorough discussion of 
the Credit Anstalt failure, see H. ELLIS, EXCHANGE CONTROL IN CENTRAL EUROPE 27-73 (1941) 
[hereinafter cited as ELLIS]. 
19. See, e.g., Williams, Extraterritorial Eriforcemmt of Excho.nge Control Regulations Under the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Agreemmt, 15 VA.]. INT'L L. 319, 323. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Williams]. 
20. /d. See generally ELLIS, supra note 18. 
21. Direct controls are defined as: "governmental legislative or administrative acts which in-
terfere with the free international flow of goods, services, or capital. " SHUSTER supra note 14, at 
27. 
22. Williams, supra note 20, at 322-23. 
23. Metzger, Exchange Controls and International Law, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 311, 315, 318 [herein-
after cited as Metzger]. 
24. See SHUSTER, supra note 14, at 97. 
25. Id. 
26. /d. 
27. Professor Ellis, in his exhaustive tome on this topic distinguishes five types of exchange 
control, identified by degree of departure from the character of a free international system. See 
ELLIS, supra note 18, at 1-7. 
28. Williams, supra note 19, at 352 n.152. 
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regulations which directly restricted payments on capital transfers;29 and 3) 
regulations which required that foreign exchange be surrendered to central of-
ficials. 30 The developing system of exchange controls continued to impair in-
ternational trade. 
B. A Definition oj "Exchange Control Regulations" 
1. The Technical Character of Exchange Control Regulations 
Two general types of direct economic controls were developed: those which 
controlled financial transactions and those which controlled trade. 31 Although 
they are closely related and, for the most part, serve the same economic 
goals,32 the two types of controls are juridically distinct. 33 An effective defini-
tion of "exchange control regulation" would apply only to restrictions on 
financial transactions and would distinguish exchange controls from trade 
controls. 
One such definition classifies economic controls "as financial controls if 
they affect the means of payment for an international transaction, and as trade 
controls if they affect the underlying transaction itself."34 Characterization as 
an exchange control measure is determined by the regulation's technical 
character rather than by its effect. 3~ Indirect controls on international 
payments, such as import quotas, would not be considered exchange control 
regulations because they are directed toward the trade transaction itself;36 only 
direct controls on the payments resulting from a trade transaction would 
qualify.37 Licensing requirements are common in both trade and exchange 
control regulations. 38 However, according to Sir Joseph Gold: 39 
If the license that was required did relate only to the ability of the 
defendant to make the import, and did not prescribe that he must 
get a license in order to obtain or use foreign exchange or pay in 
29. ELLIS, supra note 18, at 2. 
30. /d. at 1; Williams, supra note 19, at 353. 
31. SHUSTER, supra note 19, at 28. 
32. R. WILLEY, FOREIGN EXCHANGE: THE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS, AND CONTROL 107 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WILLEY); SHUSTER, supra note 14, at 140 (" Restrictive trade and pay-
ment measures are both symptoms of and cures for, the same ailment - namely, a balance of 
payments deficit.") 
33. SHUSTER, supra note 24, at 29. 
34. /d. at 28. 
35. Set Williams, supra note 19, at 353; J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS, 
PARTS VIII·XI 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GOLD). 
36. S .. Williams, supra note 19, at 353-54. 
37. S .. id. 
38. Set L. YEAGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: THEORY, HISTORY, AND POLICY 
114-31 (2nd ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as YEAGER). 
39. Gold has been with the IMF since 1946. He became Assistant General Counsel in 1954, 
was General Counsel from 1960 to 1979 and is now Senior Consultant. 
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domestic currency for the import, it was probably not an "ex-
change control regulation. "40 
In sum, unless a regulation is addressed to the financial aspect of an interna-
tional transaction, it should not be considered an exchange control regulation. 
2. The Purpose of Exchange Controls 
Several definitions of the term "exchange control regulations" have been 
suggested. H Some of these refer only to the technical character of the regula-
tions. Professor Nussbaum's definition is one such example: "Exchange con-
trol means literally control of foreign money or, more precisely, of media of 
international payment by the government. "42 However, a definition which 
refers solely to the term's technical character fails to distinguish an exchange 
control from other types of regulations which control media of payment. 
Other definitions of the term refer to the purpose of exchange controls. 43 
Historically, exchange controls have served a number of purposes. H The two 
most common justifications for imposing exchange controls have been: 1) to 
alleviate disequilibrium in a country's balance ofpayments45 or 2) to remedy a 
shortage of foreign exchange. 46 
Professor Mann incorporates the purposes of exchange controls in his 
definition of exchange control regulations as "enactments which control the 
movement of currency, property or services for the purposes of protecting the 
40. GOLD, supra note 35, at 7. 
41. See, e.g., YEAGER, supra note 38, at 138 ("exchange control may be defined as a system of 
regulations designed to assure both that foreign exchange coming into the possession of residents 
of the controlling country is sold in official channels and that this exchange is used only for ap-
proved payments abroad"); R. HARROD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 101 (rev. ed. 1958) [here-
inafter cited as HARROD] (" Exchange control is the generic expression for laws or regulations 
making it impossible for individuals to get foreign currency with a view to carrying out transac-
tions that are unlawful in themselves. "). 
42. NUSSBAUM, supra note 14, at 446. 
43. See, e.g., Campos, Extraterritorial Effects of Foreign Exchange Controls in International Transac-
tions, 34 PHIL. L. ]. 555, 556 (1959) ("Foreign exchange controls are regulations issued by a 
sovereign state in order to protect its currency in particular and its economy in general. "); 
MANN, supra note 7, at 444 ("Exchange control regulations are enactments which control the 
movement of currency, property or services for the purpose of protecting the financial resources 
of a country. "). 
44. Professor Ellis outlines seven purposes, more technical than necessary for purposes of the 
present discussion. See ELLIS, supra note 18, at 290. 
45. SHUSTER, supra note 14, at 139; HARROD, supra note 38, at 103. In nearly every case "the 
origin of the control can be traced to a deterioration of the balance of payments." Cabot, Exchange 
Control and the Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved Puzzle, 99 U.PA. L. REV. 476, 479 (1951). 
ld. 
46. WILLEY, supra note 32, at 102; Metzger, supra note 23, at 315, 318. 
Exchange control is ordinarily employed when a country has an insufficient amount of 
actual or anticipated foreign currencies to pay for all ofits existing or anticipated obliga-
tions in that currency or currencies. In such an event, the country is concerned that 
what it has or expects to get of that currency shall be used for what it considers to be 
essential and not unessential imported goods. 
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financial resources of a country. "47 This definition has been widely accepted 
and cited. 48 The more useful definition ofthe term "exchange control regula-
tions" refers not only to the technical character of the regulations as restricting 
media of payment, but also to the purpose of the regulations in protecting a 
nation's financial resources. 
3. "Trading with the Enemy" Regulations 
The action taken by the United States with respect to Iran is comparable to 
the American "Freezing Order" of 1940. 49 That Order, a "trading with the 
enemy regulation"50 which was promulgated after Germany invaded Nor-
way, prohibited transactions involving Norwegian and Danish property not 
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. 51 Whether "trading with the 
enemy" regulations, such as the Order of 1940, fall within the definition of ex-
change control regulations52 is, thus, a particularly relevant question. 
In a 1942 pamphlet,53 the General Counsel for the U.S. Treasury explained 
that the purpose of the freeze was to keep assets out of the enemy's hands and, 
thus, to prevent their use to the enemy's advantage. 54 The General Counsel 
explained that the Freezing Order was used as "part of a far-reaching policy 
in the economic and financial area for purposes of weakening and ultimately 
defeating the aggressor nations. "55 To accomplish this objective, the Order 
subjected "to regulation and scrutiny all transactions in which blocked coun-
tries or their nationals have any type of interest. "56 
Most commentators agree that "trading with the enemy" regulations are 
not exchange control regulations because they are not imposedfor purposes of pro-
tecting the nation's cu"ency in periods of balance of payments disequilibrium. 57 
Nussbaum, for example, argues that although the restrictions imposed by the 
47. MANN, supra note 6, at 383-84. 
48. See, e.g., Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls after the International Monetary Fund, 62 YALE 
L. J. 867, 890-91; Williams, supra note 19, at 252. 
49. Executive Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (1940), as amended by Executive Order No. 
8785,6 Fed. Reg. 2897 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Order of 1940). 
50. MANN. supra note 7, at 444. The freezing control Order is based on Section 5(b) of the 1917 
Trading with the Enemy Act. 50 U.S.C. App. U 1-44 (1970). 
51. Order of 1940, supra note 49. 
52. Several commentators have addressed this issue. See, e.g., G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DEVEWPMENT FINANCING 294 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as DELAUME); Williams, supra note 10, at 353, 356; MANN, supra note 7, at 444; NUSSBAUM, 
supra note 14, at 455-57. 
53. E. FOLEY, FREEZING CONTROL: As A WEAPON OF ECONOMIC DEFENSE (1942). 
54. /d. at 5-6. 
55. /d. at 1. 
56. /d. For a similar statement concerning the purposes of the American freezing control, see 
Freutel, supra note 18, at 31. 
57. DELAUME, supra note 52, at 294; Williams, supra note 19, at 353; MANN, supra note 7, at 
444. 
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1940 Order were directed toward exchange as such, thereby meeting the 
technical requirement of an exchange control, the Order was far removed 
from the general pattern of exchange controls. 58 According to Nussbaum, this 
conclusion follows because the Order's "primary objective was not so much 
the husbanding of American foreign exchange for the protection of the na-
tional monetary system as economic warfare against the enemy." 59 Further-
more, Nussbaum indicates that the drafters of the articles of Agreement of the 
IMF apparently did not classify the Freezing Order of 1940 as an instance of 
exchange control. 60 Had they done so, he asserts, they could not have held the 
dollar to be a "convertible" currency because exchange restrictions would 
have automatically made it "inconvertible," according to Article XIX( d) of 
the Fund Agreement. 61 
Professor Mann shares Nussbaum's opinion that Freezing Orders are not 
exchange control regulations: "Although the problem of definition will not 
always be free from doubt, it ought to be clear that, for example, the American 
system of foreign funds control cannot be described as an exchange control 
regulation, because its purpose is not the protection of the dollar currency. "62 
Therefore, trading with the enemy regulations generally should not be con-
sidered exchange control regulations. Although such regulations meet one 
criterion of exchange controls in that they directly effect financial transfers ir-
respective of the nature of the underlying transactions, they fail to meet the 
second criterion in that their purpose is not to conserve the supply of the na-
tion's currency. 
C. The Nature of the Iranian Assets Control Regulations 
The Iranian Assets Control Regulations are comparable to several types of 
control regulations discussed above. 63 However, on the basis of the standards 
58. NUSSBAUM, supra note 14, at 455·57. 
59. /d. at 455-56. 
60. /d. 
61. Id. at 457 n.57. 
62. MANN, supra note 7, at 444. Other authorities consistently support the view that an ex-
change control regulation's character is determined by its effect on the purely financial aspect of 
transactions. Professor Williams states: 
Exchange control regulations to which Article VIII Section 2(b) applies are those laws 
or regulations genuinely concerned with the conservation of a country's economic 
resources and are directed to the financial aspect of an international transaction -
whether current or capital transaction. Included are rules restricting the making of 
payments as well as exchange surrender regulations. Excluded are tariffs, trade restric-
tions, price control, and trading with the enemy regulations and legal tender laws, cours 
legal and cours force. 
Williams, supra note 19, at 356. 
63. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Regulations, § II.A.3 supra. See also, e.g., notes 27-30 
and accompanying text, supra. 
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governing "exchange control regulations, "6+ they are not within the generally 
understood meaning of that term. That is, the Regulations are not directed to 
controlling the movement of the exchange resources of the United States in the 
interest of preserving the national currency. 65 
1. The Financial Aspect of Transactions Test: Are the Regulations 
Directed Specifically to the Financial Aspect of Transactions with Iran? 
The technical character of the Regulations makes a simple categorization of 
them difficult. The Regulations are designed as a licensing procedure,66 which 
is a typical form of exchange control,67 but they do not deal with "exchange" 
as such. Rather, the Regulations are concerned with Iranian property of all 
types, including, but not limited to, exchange. 68 The effect of the Regulations 
is to halt virtually all transactions with Iran, including payments and transfers 
to any person in Iran. The Regulations prohibit all property transactions in 
which Iran has any interest and which are subject to the direct or indirect 
jurisdiction of the United States, unless a license is obtained from the 
Treasury Department. 69 
Transactions with respect to "frozen" assets are not the only actions pro-
hibited by the Regulations; all payments are barred. 70 The comment of Gold 
is relevant in this respect. 71 The licenses required by the Regulations relate 
only to the ability of a licensee to make a transaction otherwise prohibited; 72 the 
Regulations do not require a iicense in order to obtain or use foreign exchange or to 
64. See § II.B supra. 
65. See notes 79-84 and accompanying text, infra. 
66. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. S 535.206 (1980): 
(a) Except as authorized by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or 
otherwise, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall, directly or 
indirectly, in any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an 
enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian governmental entity, or any person in 
Iran: 
(4) Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property 
or interest therein to any person in Iran. 
See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.207 (1980) which prohibits certain trade, shipping and service transac-
tions except as authorized by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise. 
67. See Williams, supra note 19, at 352 n.12. 
68. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979). Section 535.201 of the Regulations provides; 
No property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which is in the possession 
of or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which on or 
after the effective date Iran has any interest of any nature whatsoever may be 
transfered, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in except as authorized. 
31 C.F.R. S 535.201 (1980). "Property" is defined in the Regulations to include all conceivable 
types of holdings including money, checks and bank deposits. 31 C.F.R. § 535.311 (1980). 
69. 31 C.F.R. § 535.207 (1980). 
70. 31 C.F.R. §S 535.201, 206(a)(4) (1980). 
71. See note 40 and accompanying text, supra. 
72. See 31 C.F.R. S 535.201 (1980). 
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pay in domestic currency for an approved transaction. 73 According to Gold's 
analysis, the Regulations would not be a type of exchange control because 
their effect is not restricted to exchange, but extends to other aspects of trans-
actions and trade as well. 74 
A week after their original promulgation, the Regulations were amended to 
limit their application to deposits held in U.S. dollars. Arguably, Gold's 
analysis would not be fully applicable. As originally issued on November 14, 
1979, the Regulations blocked all deposits held abroad by branches and sub-
sidiaries of U.S. banks. 75 However, on November 21, the promulgation of 
Section 535.566 of the Regulations unblocked deposits held in currencies other 
than U.S. dollars,76 although conversion of blocked, dollar deposits into 
foreign currencies remained proscribed. 77 Thus, despite this revision, the 
Regulations essentially continued to impose a Treasury Department license 
requirement on a broad range of transactions. Because the Regulations ap-
plied to more than the purely financial aspects of transactions, they cannot be 
deemed to meet this criterion of the definition of "exchange control regula-
tions. " 
2. The Protection of Exchange Resources Test 
Under the standards discussed thus far, a bonafide exchange control regula-
tion must have as its purpose the protection of the national currency. 78 There 
is some evidence that the Regulations were issued to protect the dollar from a 
perceived Iranian attempt to damage or destroy its value as a medium of inter-
national payment. Before the Regulations were issued, Mr. Bani Sadr, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, called for a fundamental review of the Iranian 
monetary system and for a currency independent of the dollar. 79 On 
November 14, Mr. Bani Sadr announced Iran's intent to withdraw, im-
mediately, all of its assets from U.S. banks,8() threatening a drastic contraction 
of the dollar supply. President Carter issued his Executive Order that day, ap-
parently in response to this Iranian threat to the American currency. 
73. See, t.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980) which permits payment to blocked accounts in 
domestic banks without a license under certain circumstances; 31 C.F .R. § 535.531 (1980) which 
permits payments of certain checks and drafts without a license until January 14, 1980. 
74. GOLD, supra note 35, at 7. 
75. See note 68 supra. 31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1980) defines persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States to include "[alny corporation organized under the laws of the United States or 
any state, territory, possession or district of the United States." An American bank doing 
business abroad would therefore be subject to the Regulations. 
76. 31 C.F.R. § 535.566 (1980). 
77. !d. 
78. See § II.A.2 supra. 
79. F.B.I.S., Nov. 11,1979, Rl. 
80. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 5; F.B.I.S. Nov. 15, 1979, RI. 
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However, the stated purpose and the terms of the Regulations go beyond 
the protection of the exchange resouces of the United States. As summarized 
by the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Department of the Treasury, the 
purpose of the Regulations was "to meet the threat to the national security, 
foreign policy and economy of the United States with respect to which the 
President declared a national emergency in the Executive Order. "81 Further-
more, the Regulations themselves are not restricted to transactions affecting 
the dollar, but also deal with a wider spectrum of commercial intercourse. 82 In 
analyzing this aspect of the Regulations, the comparison between the Iranian 
Freezing Order and Regulations and the Freezing Order of 1940 is useful. 
The purpose of the 1940 Order was not so much the husbanding of foreign ex-
change as economic warfare against the enemy, 83 even though the United 
States was not actively involved in the war against the countries which were 
the target of the Order. In this respect, the Regulations resemble traditional 
"trading with the enemy" regulations more closely than they resemble ex-
change controls. Their purpose is to restrict all financial dealings with a hostile 
country.84 To the extent that the Regulations resemble traditional "trading 
with the enemy" regulations, they cannot be considered to be within the 
generally understood meaning of exchange controls. 
III. ARE THE IRANIAN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS 
CONSISTENT WITH THE FUND AGREEMENT? 
Even if the Iranian Assets Control Regulations are characterized as "ex-
::hange control regulations," the Regulations must also have been "imposed 
consistently with [the Fund] Agreement"85 in order to invoke Article VIII § 
2(b) to give the Regulations extraterritorial effect. The Agreement provides 
several criteria for determining whether controls should be deemed consistent 
with its purposes. 86 The immediate focus of this inquiry is Article VIII § 2(a), 
which obliges member states of the IMF to avoid restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current international transactions.87 
A. Reasons for Avoiding Restrictions 
The international experience with exchange restrictions in the 1930' s is con-
sidered an unsatisfactory period in world affairs. The restrictions were a great 
81. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979). 
82. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text, supra. 
83. NUSSBAUM, supra note 14, at 455-56. 
84. See notes 49-62 and accompanying text, supra. 
85. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII S 2(b). 
86. See Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1; note 99 and accompanying text, infra. See also II.B infra. 
87. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII § 2(b). 
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inconvenience both to the governments which administered them and to the 
individual firms subject to them. ss More important, they were a symptom of 
contracting economies and reflected a shrinking volume of world trade. S9 The 
widespread application of exchange controls during this period destroyed the 
international monetary organization which had functioned un til that time. 90 
The experience of the 1930's showed that uncoordinated restrictions can 
degenerate, under the pressure of events, into a system of trading or currency 
blocs. 91 Ultimately, a long-term disequilibrium results in which economic 
hardship is widespread. 92 In order to combat this problem and to promote the 
growth of world trade, the drafters of the IMF Agreement sought to create a 
"one-world," multilateral system of payment which would make the condi-
tions for the international payments for the sale of goods more stable. 93 
Although experience warned of potential hazards, the drafters initially chose a 
system of fixed exchange rates. 94 Historically, fixed exchange systems had en-
couraged protective exchange restrictions to compensate for balance of 
payments deficits when exchange rates were temporarily inappropriate. 95 
However, the drafters had learned from the experience of the 1930's that cur-
rent transactions were too important to the growth of world trade to be 
restricted. 96 Thus, the drafters obliged member nations to avoid restrictions of 
this type. 97 
88. H. AUFRICKT, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, LEGAL BASES, STRUCTURE, FUNC-
TIONs49-50 (1964). 
89. /d. 
90. S. HORIE, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 32 (1964). [hereinafter cited as HORlEj. 
91. A. CROCKETT, INTERNATIONAL MONEY 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CROCKETTj. 
92. J. GOLD, THE FUND'S CONCEPTS OF CONVERTIBILITY 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GOLD, 
CONVERTIBILITYj. 
93. Ste Metzger, supra note 23, at 318; CROCKETT, supra note 91, at 15. 
94. It was a system of occasionally adjustable exchange rates, whereby rates could fluctuate 
within a small range. Agreement, supra note 3, art. IV § 3. The par value ofa member's currency 
could not be changed except to correct a fundamental disequilibrium. /d. § 5. 
95. Machlup, Proposals for Reform of the International Monetary System 230-33, in SUBCOM. ON IN-
TERNATIONAL EXCHANGE AND PAYMENTS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. 87TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., FACTORS AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Comm. Print 1962); 
CROCKETT, supra note 91, at 14-15; HORIE, supra note 90, at 33; YEAGER, supra note 38, at 138. 
96. GOLD, CONVERTIBILITY, supra note 92, at 6-7. In its 1967 Annual Report the IMF 
reiterated: "there are strong reasons to believe that a unitary exchange rate which is supported 
without undue recourse to restrictions can provide an active and dynamic link between the 
growth of the economy and the world at large." IMF, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT 46 (1967). See 
generally Machlup, supra note 95, at 230-33 (a fixed exchange system is superior to a flexible one 
only where there are no controls). 
The drafters, however did not find it necessary to protect the freedom to transfer capital across 
boundaries. GOLD, CONVERTIBILITY, supra note 92, at 6-7. The apparent reason is that controls 
on capital transfers do not constitute a substantial enough interference to the making of financial 
settlements. SHUSTER, supra note 14, at 142-43. Thus, Article VI § 3 reserves to members the 
right to control capital transfers. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VI § 3. 
97. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII § 2(a). 
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The principle that payments for goods and services on current account 
should be free from restrictions is embodied in the first article of the IMF 
Agreement. According to this provision, the Fund's purposes are: "(iii) [T]o 
maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members ... (iv) To assist 
in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.' '98 To this end, the Fund 
"[ s ] hall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth 
[ above]. "99 
To carry out these purposes, Article IV § 4(a) states that "[e]ach member 
undertakes to collaborate with the Fund ... to maintain orderly exchange ar-
rangements with other members .... "100 Article VIII § 2(a) of the Agree-
ment further provides that, "no member shall, without the approval of the 
Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current 
international transactions." 101 
However, the authors of the Agreement anticipated that some restrictions 
would undoubtedly be found necessary by nations in times of distress. Thus, 
the Agreement provided mechanisms for the adoption of certain financial 
restrictions. 102 
B. Some Permitted Restrictions on International Payments 
While the Fund Agreement allows members complete freedom to impose 
restrictions on capital transfers,103 it permits only a limited set of restrictions 
on current international payments. Restrictions may be made only with 
respect to a scarce currencyl04 or during the post-war transitional period. lOS 
Apart from these two cases,106 Article VIII § 2(a) provides that restrictions for 
98. Agreement, supra note 3, art. I. The importance which the Fund attaches to the elimina-
tion of restrictions is also reflected in the Fund's goal for complete convertibility. /d. art. XIX(d). 
According to the Commentary on the Second Amendment, Article VIII § 2(a) "constitutes what 
has become the basic convertibility provision of the Articles." PROPOSED SECOND AMENDMENT 
TO THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, A REPORT BY THE 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, Part II, Chap. c, § 14 (1976). The 
absence of restrictions is an important aspect of the goal of convertibility of Article XIX( d). The 
Fund's definition of a completely convertible country is one which has eliminated exchange con-
trol. Agreement, supra note 3, art. XIV. 
99. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. I. 
100. Id. art. IV § 4(a). 
101. Id. art. VIII § 2(a). 
102. SHUSTER. supra note 14, at 146. 
103. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VI § 3. 
104. /d. art. VII § 3(b). 
105. Id. art. XIV. 
106. Restrictions may also be imposed under Article XI § 2 in exchange transactions with 
non-members. /d. art. XI § 2. 
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payments and transfers for current international transactions shall not be im-
posed by a Fund member without the approval of the Fund. 107 
Clearly, the Iranian Assets Control Regulations were not imposed due to a 
scarcity of dollars or during the post-war transitional period. Thus, only three 
ways are open for the Regulations to be construed as consistent with section 
2(a) of the Fund Agreement: 1) they may be deemed to be merely "controls" 
and not "restrictions,"108 2) they may be deemed to be restrictions on capital 
transfers only,'09 and 3) they may receive Fund approval."O Each of these 
three issues will be discussed separately. 
1. Restrictions versus Controls 
The distinction between restrictions and controls has been recognized and 
definitively addressed in a decision of the IMF executive. 111 According to that 
decision, a restriction within the meaning of Article VIn S 2(a) involves a 
direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as 
such. 1I2 This decision: 
[C]learly implies that any governmental measures which either 
prohibit (a prohibition amounts to nothing more than a total 
limitation) or limit (the limitation can be less than total) either the 
availability or the use (an exchange control regime which freely 
makes available foreign exchange, but only for certain transac-
tions, is restrictive) of exchange required for the consummation of 
current international transactions will, for the purposes of the 
Fund Agreement, constitute a restriction. 113 
Arguably, all exchange restrictions are a form of controls; but not all ex-
change controls are restrictive of international payments. 114 As Gold noted, a 
"restriction" constitutes a real interference with payments and transfers for 
current international transactions.' 15 A "control," on the other hand, is 
something less than a "restriction. "116 In this sense, a control is merely a pro-
cedure to be complied with as a condition precedent to payment or transfer .117 
107. !d. art. VII § 2(a). Emphasis supplied. 
108. If the Regulations are not restrictions, then they are not in violation of the obligation of 
Article VIII § 2(a) to avoid restrictions. 
109. Restrictions on capital transfers are permitted by Article VI § 3. 
110. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII § 2(a). 
111. Decision No. 1034-(60127), Jun. I, 1960, SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 5, at 139-41. 
112. Id. 
113. SHUSTER. supra note 14, at 141-42. 
114. Fawcett, The ItltmUIliotlal Motll!tary Fund aM ItItmUIliotlfJi Law, 40 BRIT. V.B. INf'L L. 42 
(1964). 
115. J. GOLD. THE INfERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
8 (1965) (hereinafter cited as GoLD. IMFJ. 
116. Su Id. at 7, 8. 
117. Seeld. at 8. 
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As long as a control procedure is not unreasonable, it would not be inconsis-
tent with the Fund member's obligation to avoid restrictions. liS Conversely, 
although a licensing or similar procedure is not in itself a restric-
tion, it would be regarded as one if it unduly delayed the making of 
payments or transfers. There would be no doubt that it was a 
restriction if it went beyond delay in its effect and involved the ac-
tual prevention of payments and transfers. 1I9 
The Fund Agreement seeks to prohibit only restrictions, not exchange controls 
as such. 120 The Agreement prohibits only those aspects of exchange control 
systems which truly constitute an interference with financial activities, rather 
than mere procedural inhibitions on the payments process. 121 Thus, the ques-
tion of whether "controls" are "restrictions" is a question of degree. How-
ever, the purposes of the Agreement indicate that this question may hinge on 
the nature of the payments involved. "The restriction which the Articles of 
Agreement wish to abolish is, not the resident trader's inability to make 
payments at his discretion, but the Exchange Control Authorities' power to 
withold licenses for payments for current transactions to non-residents." 122 
While an exchange control may not be a restriction which is inconsistent 
with the Fund Agreement per se, it would appear to be inconsistent with the 
Fund Agreement if a control unreasonably restricts payments and transfers for 
cu"ent international transactions. 123 
2. Current versus Capital 
Whether the distinction between current and capital transactions is properly 
maintained in a member's controls, is of crucial importance in determining 
whether those restrictions are consistent with the Fund Agreement. 12f Article 
XIX(i) of the Agreement provides the operative definition of the term "cur-
rent transaction" for purposes of the Fund Agreement. 125 Initially, payments 
for "current transactions" are defined by exclusion; such payments are those 
"which are not for the purpose of transferring capital. "126 However, the arti-
cle continues to outline some examples of transactions which would be con-
sidered current under the Agreement: 
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other cur-
rent business, including services, and normal short-term banking 
and credit facilities; 
118. /d. 
119. ld. 
120. SHUSTER, sll/Jra note 14, at 142. 
121. ld. at 142-43. 
122. Mann, Money in Public lnlemtJtional Law, 96 RECUEILDES COURS 7,64 (1959). 
123. SHUSTER, supra note 14, at 142. 
124. See Williams, supra note 19, at 358. 
125. Agreement, supra note 3, art. XIX (i). 
126. /d. 
218 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV, No.1 
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other 
investments; 
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for 
depreciation of direct investments; 
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.127 
AI! UI tnese transactions, with the exception of the last,128 are clearly con-
trolled by the Regulations in question. 129 Far from being limited to the control 
of capital movements, Section 535.206(a) of the Regulations includes control 
over all transactions: "Except as authorized by means of regulations, rulings, 
instructions, licensed or otherwise, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall ... (4) make any payments, transfer of credit, or other 
transfer of funds or other property or interests therein to any person in 
Iran."130 The broad sweep of these provisions clearly includes controls on 
those transactions specifically enumerated in the Agreement as "current 
transactions," placing the Regulations in conflict with an IMF member's 
obligation to avoid restrictions on such activities. 
3. Fund Approval 
The Fund Agreement nowhere supplies the explicit standards by which the 
Fund executive will decide whether to approve restrictions under Article VIII 
S 2(a). The closest the Agreement comes to addressing the issue is the pro-
nouncement in Article I that the "Fund will be guided in all its policies and 
decisions by the purposes set forth"131 in that article. In other words, fund ap-
proval of any restrictions should be consistent with the general purposes and 
spirit of the Agreement. 
However, the only restrictions on current payments that could be justified 
under the Fund Agreement in light of its purposes and, thus, properly receive 
Fund approval, would be those that are necessary, temporary and imposed on 
balance of payments grounds. 132 Further, a distinction must be made between 
restrictions that are approved by the Fund and those to which Article VIII § 
2(b) gives extraterritorial effect. The Fund can approve a restriction to the 
limited extent that the member imposing it would not thereby be considered in 
127. /d. 
128. 31 C.F.R. S 535.563 (1980) exempts remittances up to $1,000 a month per family 
member in Iran. 
129. 31 C.F.R. § 535.206(a)(4) (1980) controls all payments for all transactions. 31 C.F.R. § 
535.201 (1980), controls any dealings in any Iranian property subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. Su note 70 and accompanying text, supra. 
130. 31 C.F.R. § 535.206(a) (1980). 
131. Agreement, supra note 3, art. I. 
132. See SHUSTEE. supra note 14, at 155; GOLD. supra note 35, at 16 (The fund Agreement seeks 
the elimination of exchange restrictions and controls but authorizes them in special cir-
cumstances, usually related to the economic difficulties of a member). 
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breach of its IMF obligations. i33 However, such an approval would not 
automatically carry with it the extraterritorial reach of Article VIII § 2(b) of 
the Agreement. Arguably, the only exchange control regulations, other than 
those expressly allowed by the Fund Agreement, which should be given ex-
traterritorial effect through approval by the Fund are those imposed as a tem-
porary adjustment for a member's payments difficulties. Consequently, the 
purposes which a particular restriction is intended to serve are crucial in deter-
mining whether the restriction can be considered an exchange control regula-
tion within the meaning of Article VIII § 2(b). 
AJune 1,1960 decision by the Executive Directors134 expresses the Fund's 
attitude towards restrictions imposed for non-balance of payments purposes. 
In the decision, the Directors stated: 
If members, for balance of payments reasons, propose to maintain 
or introduce measures which require approval under Article VIII, 
the Fund will grant approval only where it is satisfied that the 
measures are necessary and that their use will be temporary while 
the member is seeking to eliminate the need for them. As regards 
measures requiring approval under Article VIII and maintained 
or introduced for non-balance of payments reasons, the Fund 
believes that the use of exchange systems for non-balance of 
payments reasons should be avoided to the greatest possible ex-
tent, and is prepared to consider with members the ways and 
means of achieving the elimination of such measures as soon as 
possible. 135 
Despite its desire to avoid such restrictions, the Fund, in another decision,136 
recognizes that economic measures introduced for political, rather than 
balance of payments reasons, may be in a country's sovereign interest, and 
therefore, justifiable and unavoidable at times. This Fund decision recognizes 
and sanctions a special procedure for Fund approval of restrictions imposed 
for security reasons. 137 The member imposing security-motivated restrictions 
is first required to notify the Fund as promptly as circumstances permit. '38 
Notice is then circulated to the Executive Directors, who are required to in-
form the member within 30 days if they are unsatisfied that the restrictions are 
133. E.g., 'if the member imposes a restriction whicll on its face violates the Agreement, but 
which the IMF believes is justified by extraordinary circumstances (such as national security 
reasons, see notes 136-40 and accompanying text infra), the IMF can grant limited approval. As a 
result of this approval, the member imposing the restriction will be able to continue to avail itself 
of the IMF. Such approval is limited in that it does not automatically carry with it the extrater-
ritorial reach of Article VIn § 2(b) of the Agreement. 
134. Decision No. 1034-(60127), Jun. 1, 1960, SELECTEODECISIONS, supra note 5, at 140. 
135. [d. 
136. Decision No. 144-(52/51), Aug. 14, 1952, SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 5, at 133-34. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. 
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warranted solely by security reasons. 139 In the absence of any action by the 
Fund executive, the member may proceed with the understanding that the 
Fund has no objection to the imposition of the restrictions. 140 
Although this decision sanctions politically motivated restrictions which can 
be linked to national security, the decision does not determine whether such 
measures are entitled to the extraterritorial effect of Article VIII § 2(b). 
Article VIII § 2(b) fundamentally alters the generally understood rules of 
private international law. 141 Before the Fund Agreement existed, courts 
generally refused to recognize or to enforce foreign exchange control regula-
tions on public policy grounds. 142 Even where foreign regulations do not con-
flict with domestic public policy, this refusal is considered preferable to having 
one nation enforce the "revenue" laws of another .143 However, Article VIII § 
2(b) obliges members to cooperate in making other members' exchange con-
trol regulations more effective. IH Specifically, the Fund executive has inter-
preted this obligation to mean that: 
[TJhe tribunal of the member country before which the pro-
ceedings are brought will not, on the ground that they are contrary 
to public policy (ordre public) of the forum, refuse recognition of the 
exchange control regulations of the other member which are main-
tained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. 14s 
Gold has commented that the Fund Agreement obliges members to cooperate 
with the Fund and among themselves, in recognizing each other's exchange 
control regulations, because "[ i]n this way they avoid intensifying any 
economic difficulties of that member. "146 Thus, the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of exchange controls under certain circumstances comports with 
the overall purposes of the International Monetary Fund. For this reason, the 
general rule of non-recognition of foreign exchange regulations has been 
amended by international agreement. 
However, politically motivated exchange control regulations, i. e., those 
which are not justified by balance of payments reasons, appear to be beyond 
the Fund's mandate to alter customary international law. The Fund Agree-
139. ld. 
140. /d. 
141. See Metzger, supra note 23, at 326; DELAUME, supra note 52, at 292. Se. also NUSSBAUM, 
supra note 14, at 461-77 . 
142. Metzger, supra note 23, at 326. 
143. Cf Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 119 
(1964). (The statement that monetary laws are strictly territorial and have no extraterritorial ef-
fect is an oversimplification). 
144. See note 146 and accompanying text, infra. 
145. Decision No. 446-4, Jun. 10, 1949, SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 9, at 131-32. 
146. GOLD, supra note 19, at 16. Emphasis supplied. 
1981] IRANIAN ASSET CONTROLS ANDTHE IMF 221 
ment was designed to ameliorate economic problems through the promotion 
of international trade.14? 
The fundamental principle that sovereigns are not obliged to carry out the 
political acts of other sovereigns retains its place in international law .148 Inter-
national agreements in derogation of this principle should be construed nar-
rowly.149 The purposes of the Agreement cannot be construed to impose 
reciprocal political obligations among the member nations of the Fund. Such 
an obligation would be ultra vires for an organization chartered to promote in-
ternational financial stability. 150 
C. Were the Iranian Asset Control Regulations Imposed Consistently with the Fund 
Agreement? 
The Fund executive issued no objection, during the 30 days following the 
submission of the Regulations to the fund by the United States. 151 According-
ly, the U.S. could assume that there was no objection and that the Fund was 
satisfied that the Regulations were intended to preserve the security of the 
United States.152 
However, the Fund's approval of these Regulations, tacit or otherwise, does 
not make the Regulations consistent with the spirit and letter of the Fund 
Agreement. The characterization of the Regulations as a "restriction" on in-
ternational payments, including current transactions, is unavoidable. 153 The 
stated purpose of the President's Executive Order, and of the Regulations 
themselves, was to "block all Iranian assets. "154 Although the Regulations 
ostensibly impose nothing more than a licensing procedure, in their purpose 
and effect they prevent all transactions with Iran. The controls operate by 
blocking all Iranian accounts; the subsequent issuance oflicenses would mere-
ly make exceptions to this general policy. Licensing is reauired for a wide 
147. See notes 80, 81 and accompanying text, supra. 
148. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INT'L LAW 65 (5th ed. 1967). 
149. Ste id. at 96. 
150. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 
(1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 679 (1969). 
151. There is some indication that the IMF issued an affirmative approval of the Regulations. 
However, if it did, the approval has not been circulated publicly. 
152. See note 140 and accompanying text, supra. 
153. The Treasury Department's Summary of an amendment to the regulations characterizes 
the Regulations as restrictions. The amendment is titled: "IRANIAN ASSETS CONTROL REGULA-
TIONS: ADDITIONAL PROHIBITIONS." The summary reads as follows: "Summary: The Office of 
Foreign Assets Control is amending the Iranian Assets Control Regulations. The purpose of the 
amendment is to impose additional prohibitions on dealings with Iran. The effect of the Amend-
ment is that ... restn'ctions are placed on various financial transactions to which Iran is a party. " 
4-5 Fed. Reg. 24-,4-32 (1980). Emphasis supplied. 
154-. See &ec. Order No. 12,170, H Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979); H Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979); 31 
C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980). 
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range of transactions; 155 indeed, the breadth of the licensing provisions sug-
gests that it would be difficult to conceive of a foreign transaction which falls 
beyond their scope. The licensing system essentially establishes a veto power 
in the United States Government over any transaction. In fact, the Govern-
ment has used this power to preclude most transactions with Iran. Gold's 
analysis of the distinction between "restrictions" and "controls"156 suggests 
that the licensing procedure should be regarded as a "restriction" if it unduly 
delays the making of payments or transfers. 157 The Regulations do not merely 
delay, but actually prevent, payments and transfers. Under Gold's analysis, 158 
they should then be considered" restrictions. " 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order for the Fund to approve a member state's exchange control regula-
tions, such that they receive extraterritorial effect under Article VIII § 2(b), 
the regulations should meet two tests: the laws must be directed to controlling 
the movement of exchange resources as such l59 and they must be promulgated 
for balance of payments purposes. 160 The Iranian Assets Control Regulations 
fail both tests. 
Furthermore, the Regulations fail to meet the definition of "exchange con-
trol regulations. "161 They are not directed solely toward "exchange" and they 
function more as trade controls.162 The Regulations are not limited to 
movements of "capital" but they also affect payments for current transac-
tions. 163 Furthermore, because they operate more like "restrictions" than 
"controls," they are inconsistent with the Fund's goal of promoting 
unrestricted international financial transactions. l6+ Thus, the Regulations 
cannot have been imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. 
The Bretton Woods Defense should succeed only if the Regulations are 
"exchange control regulations" imposed "consistently with the Fund Agree-
ment. " The defense is not applicable with respect to the Iranian Assets Con-
trol Regulations. In situations such as this, the International Monetary Fund 
Agreement should not be strained to alter traditional conflict of laws prin-
ciples. International disputes confined to the economic arena should be con-
155. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980) which prohibits the unlicensed extension of credit to 
Iran; 31 C.F.R. § 535.424 (1980) which requires a license to enter into any service contract in 
support of any enterprise in Iran. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.502-578 (subpart E) (1980). This pro-
vision regulates the issuance of licenses. 
156. See notes 115-19 and accompanying text, supra. 
157. GOLD, IMF, supra note 115, at 8. 
158. See notes 115-19 and accompanying text, supra. 
159. See § n.B.l supra. 
160. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text, supra. 
161. See § n.B supra. 
162. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text, supra. 
163. See note 130 and accompanying text, supra. 
164. See notes 153-58 and accompanying text, supra. 
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ducted with due regard to the law of uninvolved nations. Off-shore deposits 
should not implicate the host nation's law in the disputes of the currency-
issuing nation. Similarly, the fundamental mechanism of international 
monetary stability, the International Monetary Fund Agreement, should not 
become a casualty of such international disputes. 
Natalie A. Simon 
